China's military modernization is the largest peacetime buildup since the United States rearmed in the late 1930s. The numbers are publicly available — published in the Pentagon's annual report to Congress, tracked by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and documented by open-source intelligence analysts worldwide. What follows is a factual summary of what those numbers show.

Naval Expansion: The Fastest in Modern History

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is now the world's largest navy by hull count. According to the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence and the Pentagon's 2024 China Military Power Report:

For comparison, the U.S. Navy operates approximately 295 deployable battle force ships. The Royal Navy has 72. Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force has 114. India's navy has approximately 130.

Raw hull counts tell only part of the story. The composition of the PLAN's growth is significant:

CSIS satellite analysis of Chinese shipyards shows simultaneous construction of multiple major combatants at a pace that exceeds the combined output of all European shipyards.

Missile Forces: Quantity and Reach

The PLA Rocket Force operates the world's largest and most diverse arsenal of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles. The Pentagon's annual report provides the following unclassified estimates:

Notably, the PLA is not bound by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty — which limited U.S. and Russian missile deployments until its collapse in 2019. The PLA has been free to build precisely the missile categories that the U.S. and Russia could not. The result is a missile force specifically optimized for the Western Pacific operating environment.

Specific systems of note include the DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), designed to target moving naval vessels at ranges of 1,500–4,000 km. No other nation has deployed operational ASBMs. Their effectiveness remains debated, but their existence forces significant defensive responses.

Defense Budget: The Real Numbers

China's officially announced defense budget for 2025 was approximately $240 billion USD — roughly 1.6% of GDP. However, multiple independent assessments, including those from SIPRI and the IISS, estimate actual military spending at $350–400 billion when accounting for items excluded from the official budget:

When adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) — reflecting the fact that Chinese military personnel, construction, and domestically produced weapons cost significantly less than Western equivalents — the effective spending is higher still. SIPRI's PPP-adjusted estimate puts China's defense expenditure at the equivalent of roughly $500–600 billion in U.S. purchasing terms.

The trajectory is the critical data point. China's defense budget has grown at an average of 7.2% per year over the past decade — outpacing GDP growth. In absolute terms, China's military spending has roughly tripled since 2010.

For context: Japan's defense budget, even after historic increases, stands at approximately $56 billion. South Korea's is approximately $47 billion. Taiwan's is approximately $19 billion. India's is approximately $75 billion.

Amphibious Capability: Purpose-Built

The most operationally significant indicator of intent is the investment in amphibious warfare capabilities. Large-scale amphibious operations require a specific set of assets — and China has been building them methodically.

The PLA Marine Corps has expanded from approximately 20,000 personnel in 2017 to an estimated 40,000+ today, reorganized into combined-arms brigades optimized for expeditionary operations.

These capabilities have a limited number of plausible operational uses. Large-scale amphibious assault against a defended coastline is among the most difficult military operations conceivable. The investment required is enormous. Nations build these capabilities for specific scenarios.

Anti-Access/Area Denial: The Bubble

The PLA's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy aims to prevent or delay external military forces from operating within the First Island Chain — the arc running from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. Key components include:

The combined effect is designed to create a zone in which external military intervention carries costs high enough to deter action — or at minimum, delay it long enough for a fait accompli.

Training Tempo: Exercises and Rehearsals

PLA exercises have increased in scale, complexity, and geographic scope. Publicly documented events include:

Japanese Ministry of Defense tracking data shows PLA Air Force sorties into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone increased from approximately 380 in 2020 to over 1,700 in 2024. These are not symbolic gestures — they are rehearsals that stress Taiwan's air defense readiness and provide operational data on response times and radar coverage.

What the Numbers Tell Us

Numbers do not have opinions. They do not advocate policies or predict outcomes. But they do describe reality, and the reality described by these numbers is straightforward:

A major power is building, at considerable expense and speed, a military force optimized for a specific operational scenario. The capabilities being acquired — amphibious assault ships, anti-ship missiles, area-denial systems, marine expeditionary forces — have a coherent operational logic. The training exercises rehearse a specific set of operations. The trajectory lines, in every domain, point in one direction.

What decisions follow from these numbers is a matter for policymakers, strategists, and citizens. The numbers themselves are simply there — for anyone willing to look at them.

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